Personal identity and time travel

Philosophical Studies 52 (3):427 - 433 (1987)
Memory theories of personal identity are subject to the difficulty that distinct simultaneous person stages may both stand in the memory relation to an earlier person stage. Apparently, Such theories entail that these two duplicate person stages are stages of the same person, A claim argued to be "obviously false". In this paper, I argue that the characteristics of these duplication cases usually cited to support this claim do not provide adequate evidence to make it cogent
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DOI 10.1007/BF00354057
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Mark Moyer (2008). A Survival Guide to Fission. Philosophical Studies 141 (3):299 - 322.
Heather Demarest (2015). Fission May Kill You. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (3).

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