David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Theory and Decision 46 (2):107-138 (1999)
Ellsberg's (1961) famous paradox shows that decision-makers give events with âknownâ probabilities a higher weight in their outcome evaluation. In the same article, Ellsberg suggests a preference representation which has intuitive appeal but lacks an axiomatic foundation. Schmeidler (1989) and Gilboa (1987) provide an axiomatisation for expected utility with non-additive probabilities. This paper introduces E-capacities as a representation of beliefs which incorporates objective information about the probability of events. It can be shown that the Choquet integral of an E-capacity is the Ellsberg representation. The paper further explores properties of this representation of beliefs and provides an axiomatisation for them
|Keywords||Ellsberg paradox Uncertainty aversion Choquet integral Non-additive probabilities|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
A. Ludwig & A. Zimper (2013). A Parsimonious Model of Subjective Life Expectancy. Theory and Decision 75 (4):519-541.
Alexander Zimper (2011). Re-Examining the Law of Iterated Expectations for Choquet Decision Makers. Theory and Decision 71 (4):669-677.
Takao Asano & Hiroyuki Kojima (forthcoming). An Axiomatization of Choquet Expected Utility with Cominimum Independence. Theory and Decision.
Christian Bauer (2012). Products of Non-Additive Measures: A Fubini-Like Theorem. Theory and Decision 73 (4):621-647.
Similar books and articles
Gary Gigliotti (1996). The Testing Principle: Inductive Reasoning and the Ellsberg Paradox. Thinking and Reasoning 2 (1):33 – 49.
Alex Voorhoeve, Ken Binmore & Lisa Stewart (2012). How Much Ambiguity Aversion? Finding Indifferences Between Ellsberg's Risky and Ambiguous Bets. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 45 (3):215-38.
Jeffrey Helzner (2009). On the Application of Multiattribute Utility Theory to Models of Choice. Theory and Decision 66 (4):301-315.
Katie Steele (2007). Distinguishing Indeterminate Belief From “Risk-Averse” Preferences. Synthese 158 (2):189 - 205.
Horacio Arló-Costa & Jeffrey Helzner (2010). Ambiguity Aversion: The Explanatory Power of Indeterminate Probabilities. Synthese 172 (1):37 - 55.
Matthew J. Ryan (2001). Capacity Updating Rules and Rational Belief Change. Theory and Decision 51 (1):73-87.
Joseph B. Kadane (1992). Healthy Scepticism as an Expected-Utility Explanation of the Phenomena of Allais and Ellsberg. Theory and Decision 32 (1):57-64.
Aldo Montesano (2001). Uncertainty with Partial Information on the Possibility of the Events. Theory and Decision 51 (2/4):183-195.
Alain Chateauneuf, Robert Kast & André Lapied (2001). Conditioning Capacities and Choquet Integrals: The Role of Comonotony. Theory and Decision 51 (2/4):367-386.
Louis Narens (2005). A Theory of Belief for Scientific Refutations. Synthese 145 (3):397 - 423.
Patrick Maher & Yoshihisa Kashima (1997). Preference Reversal in Ellsberg Problems. Philosophical Studies 88 (2):187-207.
W. Kip Viscusi & Harrell Chesson (1999). Hopes and Fears: The Conflicting Effects of Risk Ambiguity. Theory and Decision 47 (2):157-184.
Lyle Zynda (2000). Representation Theorems and Realism About Degrees of Belief. Philosophy of Science 67 (1):45-69.
Michele Bernasconi & Graham Loomes (1992). Failures of the Reduction Principle in an Ellsberg-Type Problem. Theory and Decision 32 (1):77-100.
Added to index2010-09-02
Total downloads4 ( #293,838 of 1,679,439 )
Recent downloads (6 months)0
How can I increase my downloads?