Perceptual intentionality, attention and consciousness

In Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. New York: Cambridge University Press 181-202 (1998)
of presence cannot be explained by appeal to the notion of non-representational of experience. world see John Campbell, 'The Role of Physical Objects in Thinking', in Representation: Problems Perceptual Intentionality, and.
Keywords Consciousness  Perception  Phenomena  Block, N
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DOI 10.1017/S1358246100004367
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Matthew Kennedy (2007). Visual Awareness of Properties. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (2):298-325.
Thomas Crowther (2010). The Agential Profile of Perceptual Experience. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 110 (2pt2):219-242.

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