Counterconventional conditionals

Philosophical Studies 127 (3):459 - 482 (2006)
Abstract
Some philosophical positions maintain that some aspect of reality depends on human practices, cognitive attitudes or sentiments. This paper presents a framework for understanding such positions in a way that renders them immune to a number of natural but allegedly devastating objections.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 10,273
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
David Lewis (1979). Attitudes de Dicto and de Se. Philosophical Review 88 (4):513-543.
Casimir Lewy (1940). Logical Necessity. Philosophical Review 49 (1):62-68.

View all 10 references

Citations of this work BETA
Iris Einheuser (2012). Relativized Propositions and the Fregean Orthodoxy. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (3):590-603.
Similar books and articles
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-01-28

Total downloads

37 ( #43,658 of 1,096,320 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

2 ( #130,630 of 1,096,320 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.