Graduate studies at Western
Philosophical Studies 127 (3):459 - 482 (2006)
|Abstract||Some philosophical positions maintain that some aspect of reality depends on human practices, cognitive attitudes or sentiments. This paper presents a framework for understanding such positions in a way that renders them immune to a number of natural but allegedly devastating objections.|
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