Counterconventional conditionals

Philosophical Studies 127 (3):459 - 482 (2006)
Some philosophical positions maintain that some aspect of reality depends on human practices, cognitive attitudes or sentiments. This paper presents a framework for understanding such positions in a way that renders them immune to a number of natural but allegedly devastating objections.
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy   Epistemology   Logic   Philosophy of Mind   Philosophy of Religion
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DOI 10.2307/4321702
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References found in this work BETA
David Lewis (1979). Attitudes de Dicto and de Se. Philosophical Review 88 (4):513-543.

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Citations of this work BETA
Iris Einheuser (2012). Relativized Propositions and the Fregean Orthodoxy. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (3):590-603.
Jeffrey Sanford Russell (2015). Possible Worlds and the Objective World. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (2):389-422.

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