Relativized Propositions and the Fregean Orthodoxy

Abstract
This paper answer the question how propositions whose truth is relativized to times, places, asserters or assessers can, despite their relativity, be used to represent the world
Keywords Relativism
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    References found in this work BETA
    Iris Einheuser (2006). Counterconventional Conditionals. Philosophical Studies 127 (3):459 - 482.
    Iris Einheuser (2008). Three Forms of Truth-Relativism. In Manuel Garcia-Carpintero & Max Kölbel (eds.), Relative Truth. Oxford University Press. 187-203.

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