Relativized Propositions and the Fregean Orthodoxy

This paper answer the question how propositions whose truth is relativized to times, places, asserters or assessers can, despite their relativity, be used to represent the world
Keywords Relativism
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DOI 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2010.00489.x
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References found in this work BETA
John MacFarlane (2003). Future Contingents and Relative Truth. Philosophical Quarterly 53 (212):321–336.

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