The model-theoretic argument against quantifying over everything

Dialectica 64 (2):237-246 (2010)
A variant of Hilary Putnam's model-theoretic argument against metaphysical realism appears to show that our quantifiers do not determinately range over absolutely everything. This paper argues that some recent attempts to respond to the quantificational skeptic are unsuccessful and offers an alternative response: the key to answering the skeptic is not to refute her argument but to realize that the argument's setup prevents it from being convincing to those it is directed at.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1746-8361.2010.01221.x
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Hilary Putnam (1980). Models and Reality. Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3):464-482.

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