Dialectica 59 (3):367–374 (2005)
|Abstract||The notion of a rigid designator was originally introduced with respect to a modal semantics in which only one world, the world of evaluation, is shifted. Several philosophical applications employ a modal semantics which shifts not just the world of evaluation, but also the world considered as actual. How should the notion of a rigid designator be generalized in this setting? In this note, I show that there are two options and argue that, for the currently most popular application of two-dimensional modal semantics, proper names ought to be treated as rigid relative to the world considered as actual.|
|Keywords||Rigid designation Counteractuality|
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