Duties to oneself and the concept of morality

Inquiry 11 (1-4):129 – 154 (1968)
Abstract
Why is it that most among the relatively few moral philosophers since Kant who, like J. S. Mill, have discussed the question whether there can be moral duties to oneself, have answered it negatively? One reason is that those philosophers have supposed that all moral action must be, inter alia, social; and they may have thought so because of their commitment to what is here called a 'corporationist' moral view. But such a conception of morality as social is objectionable because it does not square with ordinary opinion and because it introduces an artificial division between types of action which go together in real life.
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References found in this work BETA
Kurt Baier (1958). The Moral Point of View. Ithaca, Cornell University Press.
N. Fotion (1965). We Can Have Moral Obligations to Ourselves. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 43 (1):27 – 34.
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