Online research in philosophy

institutional framework ~ or rather a family of frameworks — for realizing the democratic ideal of giving kmms t0 the demos, power to the people. The distinction between a participatory and a representative system is not one between democracy proper and some faint approximation but a distinction between rival proposals for the implementation of democracy. My focus in this chapter is on representation in this democratic, popularly enabling scnsc. Thus the target of the chapter is narrower than it might have been. As Hcbbcs in particular argues, the idea 0f representation may bc used, not just of representatives who are subject t0 the continuing 0r periodic control 0f the people, but also 0f a hereditary, absolute: monarch. The defenders of parliament in the 1640s tried to give its members a monop01y right on the use 0f thc word (Skinner 2005), but Hobbes argued against them that it was absurd that a monarch who "had the sovcreignty" 0vcr his subjects "from a descent 0f 600 ycars’ should not be "considcrcd as their rcprcsc-:mtativc" (Hobbes 1994: 19.3). His Qwn view, to thc contrary, was that "thc King himself did. . . ever represent the person of the people of Eng12md" (Hobbes 1990: 120). But though my focus is narrower than I-I0bbcs’s, it is broader than the targét t0 which many contcmporary thcorists give their attention. As will appear, I use the notion 0f representation in such a way that any public authorities, and any citizens wh0 assume a legitimate r01e in public..

Would democratic theory in its empirical and normative guises be in a better position without the theory of the deliberative public sphere? In this paper I explore recent theories of agonistic democracy that have answered this question in the affirmative. I question their assertionthat the theory of the public sphere should be abandoned in favor of a model of democratic politics based on political contestation. Furthermore, I explore one of the fundamental assumptionsat work in the debate about the theory of the public sphere’s status, namely the assumed opposition between consensus and contestation. Questioning the rigid nature of the opposition, I go on to argue that the deliberative theory of the public sphere actually facilitates the development of the agonistic approach to democratic theory and practice. Key Words: agonistic democracy • deliberative democracy • democratic theory • Habermas • theory of the public sphere.

Deliberation and democratic legitimacy -- Moral pluralism and political consensus -- Associations and democracy (with Joel Rogers) -- Freedom of expression -- Procedure and substance in deliberative democracy -- Directly-deliberative polyarchy (with Charles Sabel) -- Democracy and liberty -- Money, politics, political equality -- Privacy, pluralism, and democracy -- Reflections on deliberative democracy -- Truth and public reason.

Most contributors to contemporary democratic theory assume that, in one way or another, the rationality of collective decisions is at least necessary, if not sufficient, for democratic legitimacy. This applies to contributions to both aggregative and deliberative democracy. Kenneth Arrow, for example, claims that it is necessary for democratic legitimacy that social preferences be rational because of possible Condorcet cycles. And according to Philip Pettit, the possibility of instances of the discursive dilemma undermines the deliberative process and in response he regards preserving collective rationality as a requirement of legitimacy. Against these authors, I shall argue that, to be legitimate, democratic decisions need not satisfy such rationality requirements.

The Australian political system is in some ways democratic, and in some ways not. The relationship between Prime Minister, Parliament and electorate seems to me the most democratic part of the system. The undemocratic features include bicameralism, federalism, monarchy, and some others. In calling certain features undemocratic I don't necessarily mean they're bad. For the views of 19th century liberals on whether democracy is a good thing, and if so subject to what limitations (if any), and several similar questions, see Liberal Democracy . My own view is that democracy (in the sense of deciding by majority vote) is not an absolute or basic political value. There is no guarantee that democratic decision making will produce justice for racial, linguistic, religious and other minorities, or that it will produce just and wise decisions about relations with other nations (e.g. on war, trading policies), or about environmental questions and other matters affecting the interests of future generations . Democracy needs to be tempered by culture or by institutions, e.g. by a liberal legal tradition, by education, by a Bill of Rights (perhaps), by special representation ("over"-representation by democratic standards) of minorities, etc. These things are connected with the "liberal" tradition, rather than with democracy. There is no reason why individuals or minorities should not press for such balances to democracy, undeterred by any opposition from the majority -- there is no political obligation " to conform to majority views. Having got that off my chest, I will look at Australia's political institutions from a democratic point of view: How democratic are they?

The way our decisions and actions can affect future generations is surrounded by uncertainty. This is evident in current discussions of environmental risks related to global climate change, biotechnology and the use and storage of nuclear energy. The aim of this paper is to consider more closely how uncertainty affects our moral responsibility to future generations, and to what extent moral agents can be held responsible for activities that inflict risks on future people. It is argued that our moral responsibility to posterity is limited because our ability to foresee how present decisions and activities will affect future people is limited. The reason for this is primarily that we are in a situation of ignorance regarding the pace and direction of future scientific and technological development. This ignorance reduces our responsibility in a temporal dimension because in most areas it is impossible to predict the interests and resource needs of future generations. In one area, however, we have fairly reliable knowledge about future people. It is reasonable to assume that future human beings will have the same basic physiological (physical and biological) needs as we have. On this basis, it is argued that we can be held responsible for activities causing avoidable damage to critical resources that are necessary to provide for future physiological needs. Furthermore, it is suggested that it is prima facie immoral to impose risks upon future generations in cases where the following conditions are fulfilled: (1) the risk poses a threat to the ability of future generations to meet their physiological needs, and (2) the risk assessment is supported by scientifically based harm scenarios.

One fundamental thesis within the rapidly growing literature on deliberative democracy is that the stability and quality of a democracy depend not only on formal institutions such as the electoral system or the structure of parliamentary representation. They depend also on certain democratic competences of the citizens, especially their capacity for democratic communication. According to this thesis, above all the capacity for democratic deliberation, i.e., for argumentation, evaluation and for a balanced decision between policy alternatives, belongs to the central competences relevant to maintaining and developing a democracy.

This Note addresses the twin problems of political short-termism and intergenerational equity. Although scholars have discussed these concerns extensively, few scholars have developed proposals to modify democratic institutions - particularly legislatures - to better consider posterity's interests. This Note critiques one such proposal by several environmental ethicists for including posterity-oriented legislators in present-generation legislatures. It then proposes a system that ties the long-term outcomes of legislators' policy preferences to their pension plans by creating a new commodities market that values the decisions legislators make and their effect on posterity.

Problems of representation lie at the centre of recent experiments in deliberative democracy. The problems are not primarily social scientific questions concerning the statistical representiveness of small-scale deliberative institutions but normative questions about their political and ethical legitimacy. Experiments in deliberative democracy often rely for their representative legitimacy on appeals to the presence of members of different groups. However, they often do so without clear sources of authorisation and accountability from those represented. The representation of nonhumans and future generations in deliberative institutions is still more problematic. In the necessary absence of their authorisation, accountability, and presence, claims to speak on their behalf relies on epistemic claims, coupled with care. To highlight these problems is not to claim that small deliberative institutions are illegitimate but rather to point out the need for a clearer account of their role in democratic institutions and the proper sources of contestability of their outcomes.

This paper considers a guardianship model for the legal representation of future generations. According to this model, national and international courts should be given the competence to appoint guardians for future generations, if agents who care about the welfare of posterity apply for the creation of a guardianship in relation to a dispute that can be resolved by the application of law. This reform would grant guardians of future people legal standing or locus standi before courts, that is, the right to bring an action before a court of law for adjudication. Although the guardianship model faces several difficult theoretical and practical problems pertaining to the representation of different near and distant future generations, it is argued that this model – and certain other legal norms intended to protect future basic needs – can be justified on the basis of the principle of liberty.