Inquiry 55 (2):171-193 (2012)
|Abstract||The purpose of this paper is to consider the following question: To what extent is it permissible for a liberal democratic state to suppress the spread of illiberal ideas (including anti-democratic ideas)? I will discuss two approaches to this question. The first can be termed the clear and imminent danger approach, and the second the preventive approach. The clear and imminent danger approach implies that it is permissible for liberal states to suppress the spread of illiberal doctrines and ideas only if they pose a clear and imminent danger to security and/or the stability of liberal democratic institutions. The preventive approach, which is the one that I will propose and defend, goes further than this: it implies that it can also be permissible for a liberal state to restrict the spread of illiberal doctrines and ideas in order to prevent certain extremist illiberal groups (which I will term offensive illiberal groups) from gaining increased popular and political support, and in order to prevent such groups from becoming significant and powerful political actors. However, the evaluation and choice of liberty-limiting suppressive measures should be guided and restricted by two principles or side-constraints: the significance principle and the least restrictive means principle.|
|Keywords||free speech illiberal groups and ideas liberalism political extremism tolerance|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Matthew J. Webb (2006). Is There a Liberal Right to Secede From a Liberal State? TRAMES 10 (4):371-386.
Kristian Skagen Ekeli (2012). The Political Rights of Anti-Liberal-Democratic Groups. Law and Philosophy 31 (3):269-297.
Nahshon Perez (2010). Why Tolerating Illiberal Groups is Often Incoherent. Social Theory and Practice 36 (2):291-314.
Peter Brian Barry (2011). Same-Sex Marriage and the Charge of Illiberality. Social Theory and Practice 37 (2):333-357.
Sune lægaard (2005). On the Prospects for a Liberal Theory of Recognition. Res Publica 11 (4).
Fareed Zakaria (2004). The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad. W.W. Norton & Co..
Corey Brettschneider (2010). When the State Speaks, What Should It Say? The Dilemmas of Freedom of Expression and Democratic Persuasion. Perspectives on Politics 8 (4):1005-1019.
Gerald F. Gaus (1999). Reasonable Pluralism and the Domain of the Political: How the Weaknesses of John Rawls's Political Liberalism Can Be Overcome by a Justificatory Liberalism. Inquiry 42 (2):259 – 284.
Kaija Rossi (2007). Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women? The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 3:165-170.
Chakravarthi Ram-Prasad (forthcoming). Pluralism and Liberalism: Reading the Indian Constitution as a Philosophical Document for Constitutional Patriotism. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy:1-22.
Liav Orgad, Illiberal Liberalism: Cultural Restrictions on Migration and Access to Citizenship in Europe.
Stephen De Wijze (2000). The Family and Political Justice: The Case for Political Liberalisms. Journal of Ethics 4 (3):257 - 281.
Yuko Kamishima (2008). Can Nussbaum's Capabilities Approach Be a Foundation of Politically Liberal Theory of Justice? Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 50:293-298.
Loren E. Lomasky (1990). Liberal Autonomy. Philosophy and Theology 4 (3):297-309.
Stephen de Wijze (1999). South Africa and the Prospect of Political Liberalism. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 2 (3):48-80.
Added to index2011-01-19
Total downloads3 ( #203,804 of 556,779 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #64,847 of 556,779 )
How can I increase my downloads?