David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
The Monist 87 (4):489-511 (2004)
Let the moral question of personal identity be the following: what is the nature of the entities we should focus our prudential concerns and ascriptions of responsibility around? (If indeed we should structure these things around any entities at all.) Let the semantic question of personal identity be the question of what is the nature of the entities that ‘person’ is true of. A naive (in the sense of simple and intuitive) view would have it that the two questions are so intimately connected that the entities we should focus our concerns and ascriptions around are, pretty trivially, the persons. In part, my aim here is to evaluate this naive view. However, I will not actually attempt to give a definite verdict on it. Rather, I will identify the assumptions under which the naive view is true, and discuss how to go about evaluating those assumptions
|Keywords||Concern Indeterminacy Metaphysics Personal Identity Relevance|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Rachael Briggs & Daniel Nolan (2015). Utility Monsters for the Fission Age. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (2):392-407.
Matt Duncan (2014). A Challenge to Anti-Criterialism. Erkenntnis 79 (2):283-296.
Sam Baron & Christina Dyke (2014). Animal Interrupted, or Why Accepting Pascal's Wager Might Be the Last Thing You Ever Do. Southern Journal of Philosophy 52 (S1):109-133.
Kristie Miller (2013). “Personal Identity” Minus the Persons. Philosophical Studies 166 (1):91-109.
Kristie Miller (2013). Prudence and Person-Stages. Inquiry 48 (3):403-417.
Similar books and articles
Christopher Buford (2009). Baker on the Psychological Account of Personal Identity. Acta Analytica 24 (3):197-209.
Eric T. Olson (2006). Is There a Bodily Criterion of Personal Identity? In Fraser MacBride (ed.), Identity and Modality. Oxford University Press 242.
Steve Matthews (2010). Personal Identity, the Causal Condition, and the Simple View. Philosophical Papers 39 (2):183-208.
Chris Heathwood (2011). The Significance of Personal Identity to Abortion. Bioethics 25 (4):230-232.
Amy Kind (2004). The Metaphysics of Personal Identity and Our Special Concern for the Future. Metaphilosophy 35 (4):536-553.
Derek Parfit (1982). Personal Identity and Rationality. Synthese 53 (2):227-241.
E. Furberg (2012). Advance Directives and Personal Identity: What Is the Problem? Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 37 (1):60-73.
Steven Rieber (1998). The Concept of Personal Identity. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (3):581-594.
Ingmar Persson (1992). The Indeterminacy and Insignificance of Personal Identity. Inquiry 35 (2):271 – 283.
David W. Shoemaker (2007). Personal Identity and Practical Concerns. Mind 116 (462):317-357.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads238 ( #12,086 of 1,938,542 )
Recent downloads (6 months)16 ( #34,147 of 1,938,542 )
How can I increase my downloads?