David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
In Cory D. Wright & Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen (eds.), New Waves in Truth. Palgrave Macmillan (2010)
I think it often happens, for various reasons, that philosophers defend radical views which, first, are too radical to be plausible, and second, are such that a less radical and more plausible view would satisfy the underlying motivations. Here is a historical example. The logical positivists famously sought to eliminate traditional metaphysics by arguing that the statements metaphysicians make are meaningless because of being unverifiable. Much of the ensuing discussion concerned whether verifiability is really necessary for meaningfulness. But clearly, even if the logical positivists were wrong about this, they could still have a strong case for the elimination of metaphysics. For already if they could establish that the statements made by metaphysicians are unverifiable. If we cannot obtain good evidence for or against the statements of metaphysics, surely metaphysics is a pointless enterprise. I will argue here that we find another instance of the same general phenomenon in the debate about truth. I think deflationists defend a radical doctrine – and a problematic one – where a less radical doctrine, which I will call (sophisticated) rejectionism, would satisfy the underlying motivations equally well. Roughly, this less radical doctrine is the doctrine that the only use we have for a truth predicate is expressive. What I will do here is to explain what this rejectionist view is, how it differs from deflationism, and how it satisfies the motivations underlying deflationism. I will not actually defend the rejectionist view. In fact, I believe it is false. All I want to argue is that much effort spent on arguing for and against deflationism is better spent arguing for and against rejectionism.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
David Barnett (2006). Zif is If. Mind 115 (459):519-566.
Glen Hoffmann (2007). A Dilemma for the Weak Deflationist About Truth. Sorites 18:129-137.
Nick Chater (1999). Why Biological Neuroscience Cannot Replace Psychology. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5):834-834.
Claire Horisk (2007). The Expressive Role of Truth in Truth-Conditional Semantics. Philosophical Quarterly 57 (229):535–557.
Stewart Shapiro (2003). The Guru, the Logician, and the Deflationist: Truth and Logical Consequence. Noûs 37 (1):113–132.
Frank Jackson (1999). A Slightly Radical Neuron Doctrine. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5):840-841.
Mark Schroeder (forthcoming). Hard Cases for Combining Expressivism and Deflationist Truth: Conditionals and Epistemic Modals. In Steven Gross & Michael Williams (eds.), (unknown). Oxford.
Kari Middleton (2007). The Inconsistency of Deflationary Truth and Davidsonian Meaning. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 6:99-103.
Dorit Bar-On & Keith Simmons (2007). The Use of Force Against Deflationism: Assertion and Truth. In Dirk Greimann & Geo Siegwart (eds.), Truth and Speech Acts: Studies in the Philosophy of Language. Routledge. 61--89.
Lionel Shapiro (2011). Deflating Logical Consequence. Philosophical Quarterly 61 (243):320-342.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads118 ( #13,054 of 1,696,233 )
Recent downloads (6 months)62 ( #2,236 of 1,696,233 )
How can I increase my downloads?