The picture of reality as an amorphous lump
In Theodore Sider, John Hawthorne & Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics. Blackwell Pub. (2008)
| Abstract | (1) Abstract objects. The nominalist (as the label is used today) denies that there exist abstract objects. The platonist holds that there are abstract objects. One example is numbers. The nominalist denies that there are numbers; the platonist typically affirms it. | |||||||||
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J. Melia (2000). Weaseling Away the Indispensability Argument. Mind 109 (435):455-480.
Anik Waldow (2010). Identity of Persons and Objects: Why Hume Considered Both as Two Sides of the Same Coin. Journal of Scottish Philosophy 8 (2):147-167.
David B. Hershenov (2008). Lowe's Defence of Constitution and the Principle of Weak Extensionality. Ratio 21 (2):168–181.
Ryan Wasserman (2002). The Standard Objection to the Standard Account. Philosophical Studies 111 (3):197 - 216.
Michael D. Resnik (1985). Ontology and Logic: Remarks on Hartry Field's Anti-Platonist Philosophy of Mathematics. History and Philosophy of Logic 6 (1):191-209.
Charles Sayward (2002). A Conversation About Numbers. Philosophia 29 (1-4):191-209.
Michael C. Rea (2000). Constitution and Kind Membership. Philosophical Studies 97 (2):169-193.
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