What are Thick Concepts?

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41 (1):25-49 (2011)
Abstract
Many theorists hold that there is, among value concepts, a fundamental distinction between thin ones and thick ones. Among thin ones are concepts like good and right. Among concepts that have been regarded as thick are discretion, caution, enterprise, industry, assiduity, frugality, economy, good sense, prudence, discernment, treachery, promise, brutality, courage, coward, lie, gratitude, lewd, perverted, rude, glorious, graceful, exploited, and, of course, many others. Roughly speaking, thick concepts are value concepts with significant descriptive content. I will discuss a number of problems having to do with how best to understand the notion of a thick concept. Thick concepts have been widely discussed in the ..
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DOI 10.1353/cjp.2011.0007
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References found in this work BETA
John McDowell (1979). Virtue and Reason. The Monist 62 (3):331-350.
Stephen Finlay (2005). Value and Implicature. Philosophers' Imprint 5 (4):1-20.
John McDowell (1981). Non-Cognitivism and Rule-Following. In S. Holtzman & Christopher M. Leich (eds.), Wittgenstein: To Follow A Rule. Routledge 141--62.
Matti Eklund (2002). Inconsistent Languages. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (2):251-275.

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Citations of this work BETA
Debbie Roberts (2013). Thick Concepts. Philosophy Compass 8 (8):677-688.

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