What vagueness consists in

Philosophical Studies 125 (1):27-60 (2005)
Abstract
The main question of the paper is that ofwhat vagueness consists in. This question must be distinguished from other questions about vagueness discussed in the literature. It is argued that familiar accounts of vagueness for general reasons failto answer the question ofwhat vagueness consists in. A positive view is defended, according to which, roughly, the vagueness of an expression consists in it being part ofsemantic competence to accept a tolerance principle for the expression. Since tolerance principles are inconsistent, this is an inconsistency view on vagueness.
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References found in this work BETA
Richmond Campbell (1974). The Sorites Paradox. Philosophical Studies 26 (3-4):175 - 191.
Matti Eklund (2002). Inconsistent Languages. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (2):251-275.

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Citations of this work BETA
Douglas Patterson (2009). Inconsistency Theories of Semantic Paradox. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (2):387 - 422.
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