Freedom, causation, and the consequence argument

Synthese 115 (3):333-54 (1998)
Abstract
  The problem of analyzing causation and the problem of incompatibilism versus compatibilism are largely distinct. Yet, this paper will show that there are some theories of causation that a compatibilist should not endorse: namely, counterfactual theories, specifically the one developed by David Lewis and a newer, amended version of his account. Endorsing either of those accounts of causation undercuts the main compatibilist reply to a powerful argument for incompatibilism. Conversely, the argument of this paper has the following message for incompatibilists: you have reason to consider defending a counterfactual theory of causation
Keywords Causation  Consequence  Free Will  Incompatibilism  Metaphysics  Lewis, D
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