Free will, chance, and mystery
Philosophical Studies 22 (2):153-80 (2003)
| Abstract | This paper proposes a reconciliation between libertarian freedomand causal indeterminism, without relying on agent-causation asa primitive notion. I closely examine Peter van Inwagen''s recentcase for free will mysterianism, which is based in part on thewidespread worry that undetermined acts are too chancy to befree. I distinguish three senses of the term chance I thenargue that van Inwagen''s case for free will mystrianism fails,since there is no single construal of the term change on whichall of the premises of his argument for free will–causalindeterminism incompatibilism are true. By use of a particularevent-causal indeterminist account of free action, I support thecase for free will–indeterminism compatibilism. | |||||||||
| Keywords | Chance Compatibilism Free Will Indeterminism Metaphysics Mystery Van Inwagen, P | |||||||||
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