Why propositions might be sets of truth-supporting circumstances

Journal of Philosophical Logic 39 (1):101 - 111 (2010)
Soames (Philos Top 15:44–87, 1987 , J Philos Logic 37:267–276, 2008 ) has argued that propositions cannot be sets of truth-supporting circumstances. This argument is criticized for assuming that various singular terms are directly referential when in fact there are good grounds to doubt this.
Keywords Propositions  Possible worlds  Situation semantics  Direct reference
Categories (categorize this paper)
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 9,357
External links
  •   Try with proxy.
  • Through your library Configure
    References found in this work BETA
    Jon Barwise & John Perry (1981). Situations and Attitudes. Journal of Philosophy 78 (11):668-691.
    David Braun (2006). Names and Natural Kind Terms. In Ernest Lepore & Barry C. Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language. Oxford University Press. 490--515.
    Tyler Burge (1973). Reference and Proper Names. Journal of Philosophy 70 (14):425-439.
    Daniel Büring (2004). Crossover Situations. Natural Language Semantics 12 (1):23-62.

    View all 33 references

    Citations of this work BETA
    Similar books and articles

    Monthly downloads

    Added to index


    Total downloads

    34 ( #43,048 of 1,088,781 )

    Recent downloads (6 months)

    3 ( #30,953 of 1,088,781 )

    How can I increase my downloads?

    My notes
    Sign in to use this feature

    Start a new thread
    There  are no threads in this forum
    Nothing in this forum yet.