David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Southern Journal of Philosophy 46 (3):339-362 (2008)
This paper argues that typical biological species are natural kinds, on a familiar realist understanding of natural kinds—classes of individuals across which certain properties cluster together, in virtue of the causal workings of the world. But the clustering is far from exceptionless. Virtually no properties, or property-combinations, characterize every last member of a typical species—unless they can also appear outside the species. This motivates some to hold that what ties together the members of a species is the ability to interbreed, others that it is common descent. Yet others hold that species are scattered individuals,of which organisms are parts rather than members. But not one of these views absolves us of the need to posit a typical phenotypic profile. Vagueness is here to stay. Some seek to explain the vagueness by saying species are united by “homeostatic property clusters”; but this view collapses into the more familiar realist picture
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Travis Dumsday (2010). Natural Kinds and the Problem of Complex Essences. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (4):619-634.
Miles MacLeod (2013). Limitations of Natural Kind Talk in the Life Sciences: Homology and Other Cases. [REVIEW] Biological Theory 7 (2):109-120.
Similar books and articles
David B. Kitts & David J. Kitts (1979). Biological Species as Natural Kinds. Philosophy of Science 46 (4):613-622.
Michael Ruse (1987). Biological Species: Natural Kinds, Individuals, or What? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 38 (2):225-242.
Mark Ridley (1989). The Cladistic Solution to the Species Problem. Biology and Philosophy 4 (1):1-16.
Michael T. Ghiselin (1974). A Radical Solution to the Species Problem. Systematic Zoology 23:536-44.
Arthur C. Caplan (1980). Have Species Become Declasse? Psa 1980:71-82.
Keith A. Coleman & E. O. Wiley (2001). On Species Individualism: A New Defense of the Species-as-Individuals Hypothesis. Philosophy of Science 68 (4):498-517.
John S. Wilkins (forthcoming). Biological Essentialism and the Tidal Change of Natural Kinds. Science and Education.
Samir Okasha (2002). Darwinian Metaphysics: Species and the Question of Essentialism. Synthese 131 (2):191-213.
Laurance J. Splitter (1988). Species and Identity. Philosophy of Science 55 (3):323-348.
P. D. Magnus (2011). Drakes, Seadevils, and Similarity Fetishism. Biology and Philosophy 26 (6):857-870.
John S. Wilkins (2010). What is a Species? Essences and Generation. Theory in Biosciences 129:141-148.
Nicole Leroux, What Are Biological Species? : The Impact of the Current Debate in Taxonomy on the Species Problem.
Philip Kitcher (1984). Species. Philosophy of Science 51 (2):308-333.
Neil E. Williams (2011). Arthritis and Nature's Joints. In Michael O'Rourke, Joseph Keim Campbell & Matthew H. Slater (eds.), Carving Nature at its Joints. Mit Press.
Added to index2010-09-14
Total downloads11 ( #132,704 of 1,096,879 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #106,891 of 1,096,879 )
How can I increase my downloads?