Can Contrariety be Reduced to Contradiction?

Abstract
Can an ontology which treats properties as really out there in the world be combined vvith the view that necessity is not out there? What about the necessity by which redness excludes greenness, or weighing 8 kg excludes weighing 6 kg? Armstrong, who combines property realism with logical atomism, argues that such exclusions reflect just the trivial necessity that a whole cannot be any of its proper parts. Buthis argument fails for colors themselves and for other cases of contrary properties. Property realism must be necessity realism
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