David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Analysis 70 (2):212-215 (2010)
The Pinocchio paradox, devised by Veronique Eldridge-Smith in February 2001, is a counter-example to solutions to the Liar that restrict the use or definition of semantic predicates. Pinocchio’s nose grows if and only if what he is stating is false, and Pinocchio says ‘My nose is growing’. In this statement, ‘is growing’ has its normal meaning and is not a semantic predicate. If Pinocchio’s nose is growing it is because he is saying something false; otherwise, it is not growing. ‘Because’ stands here for a non-semantic relation; it might be supposed to be causal or of some other nature, but it is not semantic. The paradox is discussed in relation to Tarski’s and Kripke’s theories of truth. Although the paradox is not necessarily a counter-example to a theory of a truth predicate, it is a problem for a theory of truth of the kind preserved by validity.
|Keywords||Paradox Liar Paradox Truth-teller Tarski Kripke Theory of truth Validity Pinocchio paradox|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Saul A. Kripke (1975). Outline of a Theory of Truth. Journal of Philosophy 72 (19):690-716.
Citations of this work BETA
P. Eldridge-Smith (2012). Pinocchio Beards the Barber. Analysis 72 (4):749-752.
P. Eldridge-Smith (2011). Pinocchio Against the Dialetheists. Analysis 71 (2):306-308.
Similar books and articles
Noriaki Iwasa (2011). That Truth Exists is More Logical. Think 10 (27):109-112.
Patrick Greenough (2011). Truthmaker Gaps and the No-No Paradox. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (3):547 - 563.
Roy T. Cook (2011). The No-No Paradox Is a Paradox. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (3):467-482.
Dale Jacquette (2007). Denying The Liar. Polish Journal of Philosophy 1 (2):91-98.
Matt Leonard (2012). Burge's Contextual Theory of Truth and the Super-Liar Paradox. In Michal Pelis Vit Puncochar (ed.), The Logica Yearbook 2011. College Publications.
Bradley Dowden, Liar Paradox. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Jeff Snapper (2012). The Liar Paradox in New Clothes. Analysis 72 (2):319-322.
Keith Simmons (1993). Universality and the Liar: An Essay on Truth and the Diagonal Argument. Cambridge University Press.
Jc Beall (2011). Dialetheists Against Pinocchio. Analysis 71 (4):689-691.
Added to index2010-03-27
Total downloads65 ( #24,377 of 1,099,740 )
Recent downloads (6 months)11 ( #21,060 of 1,099,740 )
How can I increase my downloads?