David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Mind 107 (426):349-363 (1998)
Empty judgements appear to be about something, and inaccurate judgements to report something. Naturalism tries to explain these appearances without positing non-real objects or states of affairs. Biological naturalism explains that the false and the empty are tokens which fail to perform the function proper to their biological type. But if truth is a biological 'supposed to', we should expect designs that achieve it only often enough. The sensory stimuli which trigger the frog's gulp-launching signal may be a poor guide to the signal's content. Teleosemantics should be anti-verificationist
|Keywords||Accuracy Epistemology Judgment Natural Representation|
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Anne Jaap Jacobson (2008). What Should a Theory of Vision Look Like? Philosophical Psychology 21 (5):585 – 599.
Crawford L. Elder (1999). Ontology and Realism About Modality. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (3):292 – 302.
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