Equality of Opportunity and Other-Affecting Choice: Why Luck Egalitarianism Does Not Require Brute Luck Equality [Book Review]
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (1):139-149 (2013)
The luck egalitarian view famously maintains that inequalities in individuals’ circumstances are unfair or unjust, whereas inequalities traceable to individuals’ own responsible choices are fair or just. On this basis, the distinction between so-called brute luck and option luck has been seen as central to luck egalitarianism. Luck egalitarianism is interpreted, by advocates and opponents alike, as a view that condemns inequalities in brute luck but permits inequalities in option luck. It is also thought to be expressed in terms of the view that no individual ought to be worse off other than because of a fault or choice of his or her own. I argue that these two characterizations of luck egalitarianism are not equivalent and that, properly understood, luck egalitarianism is compatible with widespread, potentially radical, inequalities in brute luck.
|Keywords||Equality Egalitarianism Choice Brute luck Equal opportunity|
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References found in this work BETA
Elizabeth S. Anderson (1999). What is the Point of Equality? Ethics 109 (2):287-337.
G. A. Cohen (1989). On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice. Ethics 99 (4):906-944.
G. A. Cohen (2006). Luck and Equality: A Reply to Hurley. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (2):439 - 446.
Nir Eyal (2006). Egalitarian Justice and Innocent Choice. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 2 (1).
S. L. Hurley (2003). Justice, Luck, and Knowledge. Harvard University Press.
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