Scientists and Free Will

Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 42:63-68 (2008)
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Abstract

Many scientists believe that the universe, including the human brain, is governed by natural laws and that all can be explained by natural processes. In consequence, they believe that all events, including brain events, are determined. From this, they often conclude that free will cannot exist. I believe these views are mistaken and will present several lines of argument to support this position. I conclude that the operation of free will is compatible with determinism, can be explained by natural processes and does not entail immaterial substance.

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Gerard Elfstrom
Auburn University

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