Lawlikeness and the end of science

Philosophy of Science 47 (1):56-68 (1980)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Although our theories are not precisely true, scientific realists contend that we should admit their objects into our ontology. One justification--offered by Sellars and Putnam--is that current theories belong to series that converge to ideally adequate theories. I consider the way the commitment to convergence reflects on the interpretation of lawlike claims. I argue that the distinction between lawlike and accidental generalizations depends on our cognitive interests and reflects our commitment to the direction of scientific progress. If the sciences disagree about the lawlikeness of some generalization(s), as an argument of Davidson's suggests, it follows from the interest relatively of lawlikeness that the laws of a science do not determine the essences of their objects. I conclude that this form of scientific realism provides no metaphysical support for essentialism

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 90,221

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

A realistic look at Putnam's argument against realism.Vadim Batitsky - 2000 - Foundations of Science 5 (3):299-321.
Theories of complexity and their problems.Hans Poser - 2007 - Frontiers of Philosophy in China 2 (3):423-436.
Platonism and antiā€Platonism: Why worry?Mary Leng - 2005 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 19 (1):65 – 84.
The Likeness of Lawlikeness.James H. Fetzer - 1974 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1974:377 - 391.
Earman on the Projectibility of Grue.Marc Lange - 1994 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1994:87 - 95.
Inductive immodesty and lawlikeness.Juhani Pietarinen - 1974 - Philosophy of Science 41 (2):196-198.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
88 (#176,377)

6 months
7 (#174,572)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Catherine Elgin
Harvard University

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Fact, Fiction, and Forecast.Nelson Goodman - 1955 - Philosophy 31 (118):268-269.
Mental Events.Donald Davidson - 1970 - In L. Foster & J. W. Swanson (eds.), Experience and Theory. Humanities Press.
Three Grades of Modal Involvement.W. V. Quine - 1976 - In The Ways of Paradox and Other Essays. Harvard University Press: Cambridge, MA. pp. 158-176.

Add more references