On overrating oneself. . . And knowing it

Philosophical Studies 123 (1-2):115 - 124 (2005)
When it comes to evaluating our own abilities and prospects, most (non-depressed) people are subject to a distorting bias. We think that we are better – friendlier, more well-liked, better leaders, and better drivers – than we really are. Once we learn about this bias, we should ratchet down our self-evaluations to correct for it. But we don’t. That leaves us with an uncomfortable tension in our beliefs: we knowingly allow our beliefs to differ from the ones that we think are supported by our evidence. We can mitigate the tension by waffling between two belief states: a reflective state that has been recalibrated to take into account our tendency to overrate ourselves, and a non-reflective state that has not.
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy   Epistemology   Logic   Philosophy of Mind   Philosophy of Religion
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DOI 10.2307/4321575
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References found in this work BETA
Kent Bach (1981). An Analysis of Self-Deception. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 41 (March):351-370.
Dion Scott-Kakures (1996). Self-Deception and Internal Irrationality. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (1):31-56.

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Citations of this work BETA
Jon Robson (2012). Aesthetic Testimony. Philosophy Compass 7 (1):1-10.
Tamar Szabó Gendler (2007). Self-Deception as Pretense. Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):231 - 258.
Andrew Huddleston (2012). Naughty Beliefs. Philosophical Studies 160 (2):209-222.

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