David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Studies 123 (1-2):115 - 124 (2005)
When it comes to evaluating our own abilities and prospects, most (non-depressed) people are subject to a distorting bias. We think that we are better – friendlier, more well-liked, better leaders, and better drivers – than we really are. Once we learn about this bias, we should ratchet down our self-evaluations to correct for it. But we don’t. That leaves us with an uncomfortable tension in our beliefs: we knowingly allow our beliefs to differ from the ones that we think are supported by our evidence. We can mitigate the tension by waffling between two belief states: a reflective state that has been recalibrated to take into account our tendency to overrate ourselves, and a non-reflective state that has not.
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Citations of this work BETA
Tamar Szabó Gendler (2007). Self-Deception as Pretense. Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):231–258.
Andrew Huddleston (2012). Naughty Beliefs. Philosophical Studies 160 (2):209-222.
David James Barnett (2014). What's the Matter with Epistemic Circularity? Philosophical Studies 171 (2):177-205.
Andy Egan (2011). Comments on Gendler's, “the Epistemic Costs of Implicit Bias”. Philosophical Studies 156 (1):65-79.
Jon Robson (2012). Aesthetic Testimony. Philosophy Compass 7 (1):1-10.
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