Subjective Probabilities Should be Sharp

Philosophers' Imprint 10 (05) (2010)
Abstract
Many have claimed that unspecific evidence sometimes demands unsharp, indeterminate, imprecise, vague, or interval-valued probabilities. Against this, a variant of the diachronic Dutch Book argument shows that perfectly rational agents always have perfectly sharp probabilities
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    Citations of this work BETA
    Ralph Wedgwood (2012). Outright Belief. Dialectica 66 (3):309–329.
    David Christensen (2010). Rational Reflection. Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):121-140.

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