Subjective Probabilities Should be Sharp

Philosophers' Imprint 10 (05) (2010)
Abstract
Many have claimed that unspecific evidence sometimes demands unsharp, indeterminate, imprecise, vague, or interval-valued probabilities. Against this, a variant of the diachronic Dutch Book argument shows that perfectly rational agents always have perfectly sharp probabilities
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Citations of this work BETA
Ralph Wedgwood (2012). Outright Belief. Dialectica 66 (3):309–329.
David Christensen (2010). Rational Reflection. Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):121-140.

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Seamus Bradley (2012). Dutch Book Arguments and Imprecise Probabilities. In Dennis Dieks, Stephan Hartmann, Michael Stoeltzner & Marcel Weber (eds.), Probabilities, Laws and Structures. Springer.
Jordan Howard Sobel (1990). Conditional Probabilities, Conditionalization, and Dutch Books. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1990:503 - 515.
Donald Gillies (1991). Intersubjective Probability and Confirmation Theory. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 42 (4):513-533.
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