Subjective Probabilities Should be Sharp
Philosophers' Imprint 10 (05) (2010)
| Abstract | Many have claimed that unspecific evidence sometimes demands unsharp, indeterminate, imprecise, vague, or interval-valued probabilities. Against this, a variant of the diachronic Dutch Book argument shows that perfectly rational agents always have perfectly sharp probabilities | |||||||||
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