Autonomy and freedom of choice in prenatal genetic diagnosis

Abstract
An increase in autonomy and freedom is often considered one ofthe main arguments in favour of a broad use of genetic testing.Starting from Gerald Dworkin's reflections on autonomy and choicethis article examines some of the implications which accompanythe increase in choices offered by prenatal genetic diagnosis.Although personal autonomy and individual choice are importantaspects in the legitimation of prenatal genetic diagnosis, itseems clear that an increase in choice offered by prenatalgenetic diagnosis also leads to various implications that maynegatively influence the freedom of the persons involved
Keywords autonomy  ethics  freedom  genetic testing  prenatal genetic diagnosis
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Madelyn M. Peterson (2008). Response. Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 5 (2-3):223-224.
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