Graduate studies at Western
Journal for General Philosophy of Science 42 (2):207-218 (2011)
|Abstract||The problem of ceteris paribus clauses and Hempel’s problem of provisos are closely-related difficulties. Both challenge advocates of accounts of scientific theories involving laws understood as universal generalizations, and they have been treated as identical problems. Earman and Roberts argue that the problems are distinct. Towards arguing against them, I characterize the relationship between Hempel’s provisos and one way of expressing ceteris paribus clauses. I then describe the relationship between the problems attributed to the clauses, suggesting that they form a single problem-cluster. However, Hempel’s way of formulating provisos and discussing what they involve entangles provisos with the problem of skepticism. This creates a departure in Hempel’s discussion of provisos from the distinctive problem of vacuity which characterizes the problem of ceteris paribus clauses, though for different reasons than Earman and Roberts suggest|
|Keywords||Hempel, Carl Gustav Provisos Ceteris paribus clauses Exceptions Deductivism Scientific laws Skepticism Vacuity|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
John Earman & John Roberts (1999). "Ceteris Paribus", There Is No Problem of Provisos. Synthese 118 (3):439 - 478.
Ingvar Johansson (1980). Ceteris Paribus Clauses, Closure Clauses and Falsifiability. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 11 (1):16-22.
Paul M. Pietroski & Georges Rey (1995). When Other Things Aren't Equal: Saving Ceteris Paribus Laws From Vacuity. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46 (1):81-110.
Travis Dumsday (2013). Laws of Nature Don't Have Ceteris Paribus Clauses, They Are Ceteris Paribus Clauses. Ratio 26 (2):134-147.
Peter Gildenhuys (2010). Causal Equations Without Ceteris Paribus Clauses. Philosophy of Science 77 (4):608-632.
Charles Wallis (1994). Ceteris Paribus Laws and Psychological Explanations. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1994:388 - 397.
Marc Lange (1993). Natural Laws and the Problem of Provisos. Erkenntnis 38 (2):233Ð248.
Clark Glymour (2002). A Semantics and Methodology for Ceteris Paribus Hypotheses. Erkenntnis 57 (3):395-405.
Daniel M. Hausman (1988). Ceteris Paribus Clauses and Causality in Economics. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988:308 - 316.
Nancy Cartwright (2002). In Favor of Laws That Are Not Ceteris Paribus After All. Erkenntnis 57 (3):425Ð439.
Markus Schrenk (2007). Can Capacities Rescue Us From Ceteris Paribus Laws? In B. Gnassounou & M. Kistler (eds.), Dispositions in Philosophy and Science. Ashgate.
Robert Klee (1992). Anomalous Monism, Ceteris Paribus, and Psychological Explanation. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 43 (3):389-403.
Andreas Hüttemann, Alexander Reutlinger & Gerhard Schurz, Ceteris Paribus Laws. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Barry Ward (2009). Cartwright, Forces, and Ceteris Paribus Laws. Southwest Philosophy Review 25 (1):55-62.
Added to index2011-10-18
Total downloads13 ( #95,683 of 740,918 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #61,802 of 740,918 )
How can I increase my downloads?