David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
There has been a long-standing debate between symbolicists and connectionists concerning the nature of representation used by human cognizers. In general, symbolicist commitments have allowed them to provide superior models of high-level cognitive function. In contrast, connectionist distributed representations are preferred for providing a description of low-level cognition. The development of Holographic Reduced Representations (HRRs) has opened the possibility of one representational medium unifying both low-level and high-level descriptions of cognition. This paper describes the relative strengths and weaknesses of symbolic and distributed representations. HRRs are shown to capture the important strengths of both types of representation. These properties of HRRs allow a rebuttal of Fodor and McLaughlin's (1990) criticism that distributed representations are not adequately structure sensitive to provide a full account of human cognition.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library||
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
David J. Chalmers (1990). Syntactic Transformations on Distributed Representations. Connection Science 2:53-62.
Jonathan Waskan (2010). Applications of an Implementation Story for Non-Sentential Models. In W. Carnielli L. Magnani (ed.), Model-Based Reasoning in Science and Technology. Springer 463--476.
David J. Chalmers, Robert M. French & Douglas R. Hofstadter (1992). High-Level Perception, Representation, and Analogy:A Critique of Artificial Intelligence Methodology. Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intellige 4 (3):185 - 211.
Ronald Giere (2002). 15 Scientific Cognition as Distributed Cognition. In Peter Carruthers, Stephen P. Stich & Michael Siegal (eds.), The Cognitive Basis of Science. Cambridge University Press 285.
Parker Crutchfield (2011). Representing High-Level Properties in Perceptual Experience. Philosophical Psychology 25 (2):279 - 294.
Ronald N. Giere (2007). Distributed Cognition Without Distributed Knowing. Social Epistemology 21 (3):313 – 320.
James L. McClelland, David C. Plaut, Stephen J. Gotts & Tiago V. Maia (2003). Developing a Domain-General Framework for Cognition: What is the Best Approach? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (5):611-614.
Ronald N. Giere (2007). Distributed Cognition Without Distributed Knowing. Social Epistemology 21 (3):313-320.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads61 ( #53,870 of 1,724,748 )
Recent downloads (6 months)9 ( #72,187 of 1,724,748 )
How can I increase my downloads?