David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence 14 (1):1-8 (2002)
The properties of Turing’s famous ‘universal machine’ has long sustained functionalist intuitions about the nature of cognition. Here, I show that there is a logical problem with standard functionalist arguments for multiple realizability. These arguments rely essentially on Turing’s powerful insights regarding computation. In addressing a possible reply to this criticism, I further argue that functionalism is not a useful approach for understanding what it is to have a mind. In particular, I show that the difficulties involved in distinguishing implementation from function make multiple realizability claims untestable and uninformative. As a result, I conclude that the role of Turing machines in philosophy of mind needs to be reconsidered
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Eric Hochstein (forthcoming). One Mechanism, Many Models: A Distributed Theory of Mechanistic Explanation. Synthese:1-21.
Michael S. C. Thomas, Neil A. Forrester & Angelica Ronald (2015). Multiscale Modeling of Gene–Behavior Associations in an Artificial Neural Network Model of Cognitive Development. Cognitive Science 39 (7):n/a-n/a.
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