David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Dialectica 60 (2):171-179 (2006)
At least since Democritus, philosophers have been fond of the idea that material objects do not “really” have color. One such view is the error theory, according to which our ordinary judgments ascribing colors to objects are all erroneous, false; no object has any color at all. The error theorist proposes that everything that is so, including the fact that material objects appear to us to have color, can be explained without ever attributing color to objects—by appealing merely to, e.g., surface reflectance properties, the nature of light, the neurophysiology of perceivers, and so on. The appeal of the error theory stems in significant part from the prevalent thought that such explanations are strongly suggested by our present scientific conception of the world.1
|Keywords||Belief Color Error Explanation Metaphysics Stroud, Barry|
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References found in this work BETA
Frank Jackson (1977). Perception: A Representative Theory. Cambridge University Press.
Barry G. Stroud (2000). The Quest for Reality: Subjectivism and the Metaphysics of Colour. Oxford University Press.
Paul A. Boghossian & J. David Velleman (1989). Color as a Secondary Quality. Mind 98 (January):81-103.
J. L. Mackie (1976). Problems From Locke. Clarendon Press.
Barry G. Stroud (1996). Mind, Meaning and Practice. In Hans D. Sluga & D. G. Stern (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Wittgenstein. Cambridge University Press
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