Consciousness, self-organization, and the process-substratum relation: Rethinking nonreductive physicalism
Graduate studies at Western
Philosophical Psychology 13 (2):173-190 (2000)
|Abstract||Knowing only what is empirically knowable can't by itself entail knowledge of what consciousness "is like." But if dualism is to be avoided, the question arises: how can a process be completely empirically unobservable when all of its components are completely observable? The recently emerging theory of self-organization offers resources with which to resolve this problem: Consciousness can be an empirically unobservable process because the emotions motivating attention are experienced only from the perspective of the one whose phenomenal states are executed by the self-organizing processes which themselves constitute the consciousness. I argue that a self-organizing process can differ from the sum of its (empirically observable) substrata because, rather than just being realized by them, it actively rearranges the background conditions under which alternative component causal sequences can realize the self-organizing pattern into the future|
|Keywords||Consciousness Knowing Physicalism Science Self|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Derk Pereboom (2011). Consciousness and the Prospects of Physicalism. Oxford University Press.
Bernard Molyneux (2010). Why the Neural Correlates of Consciousness Cannot Be Found. Journal of Consciousness Studies 17 (9-10):168-188.
Jean E. Burns (1996). The Possibility of Empirical Test of Hypotheses About Consciousness. In S. R. Hameroff, A. W. Kaszniak & A. C. Scott (eds.), Towards a Science of Consciousness. MIT Press.
David Papineau (2003). Theories of Consciousness. In Quentin Smith & Aleksandar Jokic (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Essays. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Stuart Silvers (1997). Nonreductive Naturalism. Theoria 12 (28):163-84.
Max Velmans (2009). Understanding Consciousness, Edition 2. Routledge/Psychology Press.
David J. Chalmers (1995). Absent Qualia, Fading Qualia, Dancing Qualia. In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience. Ferdinand Schoningh.
Eric LaRock (2008). Is Consciousness Really a Brain Process? International Philosophical Quarterly 48 (2):201-229.
Ralph D. Ellis (1999). Why Isn't Consciousness Empirically Observable? Emotion, Self-Organization, and Nonreductive Physicalism. Journal of Mind and Behavior 20 (4):391-402.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads30 ( #46,435 of 739,352 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #37,186 of 739,352 )
How can I increase my downloads?