Diagnosing blame: Responsibility and the psychopath
Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 17 (2):199-214 (1992)
| Abstract | The diagnosis of psychopathy is controversial largely because of two notions: first, that because of their defects, psychopaths cannot understand morality, and second, that these defects should thus excuse psychopaths from moral responsibility for their actions. However, it is not clear just what is involved in understanding morality. The argument that the psychopath is ignorant of morality in the same way that one might be ignorant of facts is difficult to sustain. However, a closer examination of the psychopath's peculiar deficiencies reveals that the psychopath's understanding of morality might be impaired in other ways. Keywords: disease, ethics, philosophy, psychopathy, psychiatry, responsibility CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? | |||||||||
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Heidi L. Maibom (2008). The Mad, the Bad, and the Psychopath. Neuroethics 1 (3).
Ben Spiecker (1988). Psychopathy: The Incapacity to Have Moral Emotions. Journal of Moral Education 17 (2):98-104.
Carlo Caponecchia, Andrew Y. Z. Sun & Anne Wyatt (2012). 'Psychopaths' at Work? Implications of Lay Persons' Use of Labels and Behavioural Criteria for Psychopathy. Journal of Business Ethics 107 (4):399-408.
Jeanette Kennett (2002). Autism, Empathy and Moral Agency. Philosophical Quarterly 52 (208):340-357.
Christopher Ciocchetti (2003). Some Thoughts on Diverse Psychopathic Offenders and Legal Responsibility. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 10 (2):195-198.
Walter Glannon (2008). Moral Responsibility and the Psychopath. Neuroethics 1 (3).
Neil Levy (2007). The Responsibility of the Psychopath Revisited. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (2):pp. 129-138.
Carl Elliott & Grant Gillett (1992). Moral Insanity and Practical Reason. Philosophical Psychology 5 (1):53 – 67.
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