Philosophy of Science 76 (5) (2009)
|Abstract||Philosophers of science readily acknowledge that nonepistemic values influence the discovery and pursuit of scientific theories, but many tend to regard these influences as epistemically uninteresting. The present paper challenges this position by identifying three avenues through which nonepistemic values associated with discovery and pursuit in contemporary pollution research influence theory appraisal: (1) by guiding the choice of questions and research projects, (2) by altering experimental design, and (3) by affecting the creation and further investigation of theories or hypotheses. This analysis indicates that the effects of these values are sufficiently complex and epistemically significant to merit further attention. †To contact the authors, please write to: Kevin Elliott, Department of Philosophy, University of South Carolina, Columbia, SC 29208; e‐mail: firstname.lastname@example.org . Daniel McKaughan, Department of Philosophy, Boston College, Chestnut Hill, MA 02467; e‐mail: email@example.com.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Toby J. Sommer (2001). Suppression of Scientific Research: Bahramdipity and Nulltiple Scientific Discoveries. Science and Engineering Ethics 7 (1):77-104.
Daniel N. Osherson & Scott Weinstein (1988). Finite Axiomatizability and Scientific Discovery. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988:409 - 412.
Kevin Elliott (2011). Direct and Indirect Roles for Values in Science. Philosophy of Science 78 (2):303-324.
Torsten Wilholt (2009). Bias and Values in Scientific Research. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 40 (1):92-101.
Robert McLaughlin (1982). Invention and Induction Laudan, Simon and the Logic of Discovery. Philosophy of Science 49 (2):198-211.
Kevin C. Elliott (2009). The Ethical Significance of Language in the Environmental Sciences: Case Studies From Pollution Research. Ethics, Place and Environment 12 (2):157 – 173.
Kevin Elliott (2004). Error as Means to Discovery. Philosophy of Science 71 (2):174-197.
Daniel Steel (2010). Epistemic Values and the Argument From Inductive Risk. Philosophy of Science 77 (1):14-34.
Laurie Anne Whitt (1990). Theory Pursuit: Between Discovery and Acceptance. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1990:467 - 483.
Added to index2009-06-12
Total downloads34 ( #35,368 of 549,125 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,361 of 549,125 )
How can I increase my downloads?