David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Ratio 18 (4):371–384 (2005)
Physical realism is the thesis that the world is more or less as present‐day physical theory says it is, i.e. a mind‐independent reality, that consists fundamentally of physical objects that have causal powers, are located in space and time, belong to natural kinds, and interact causally with each other in various natural kinds of ways. It is thus a modern form of physicalism that takes due account of the natural kinds structure of the world. It is a thesis that many present‐day scientific realists would surely accept. Indeed, some might say that physical realism just is scientific realism, but under another name. However, the argument that is presented for physical realism is not the standard one for scientific realism. It is not a two‐stage argument from the success of science to the truth of scientific theories to the reality of the entities postulated in these theories. It is more powerful than this, because it is more direct, and its premisses are more secure. It is more direct, because it develops what is basically a physicalist ontology as the only plausible metaphysical explanation of the new scientific image of the world. It is more secure, in that it does not depend, as the standard argument does, on any doubtful generalisations about the nature or role of scientific theory
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
John Bigelow & Robert Pargetter (1990). Science and Necessity. Cambridge University Press.
B. D. Ellis (2001). Scientific Essentialism. Cambridge University Press.
B. D. Ellis (1990). Truth and Objectivity. Basil Blackwell.
Brian Ellis (1992). Scientific Platonism. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 23 (4):665-679.
Citations of this work BETA
Stathis Psillos (2005). Scientific Realism and Metaphysics. Ratio 18 (4):385–404.
John Heil (2005). Kinds and Essences. Ratio 18 (4):405–419.
Steve Fleetwood (2009). The Ontology of Things, Properties and Powers. Journal of Critical Realism 8 (3):343-366.
Andreas Karitzis (2011). On Devitt's Defence of Realism. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 42 (1):61 - 73.
Similar books and articles
Reese M. Heitner (2000). Is Design Relative or Real? Dennett on Intentional Relativism and Physical Realism. Minds and Machines 10 (2):267-83.
J. J. C. Smart (1963). Philosophy And Scientific Realism. Humanities Press.
Ausonio Marras (2001). On Putnam's Critique of Metaphysical Realism: Mind-Body Identity and Supervenience. Synthese 126 (3):407-426.
Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert (2003). Color Realism and Color Science. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):3-21.
Roy Wood Sellars (1932/1966). The Philosophy of Physical Realism. New York, Russell & Russell.
Nicholas Maxwell (1993). Induction and Scientific Realism: Einstein Versus Van Fraassen: Part Two: Aim-Oriented Empiricism and Scientific Essentialism. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44 (1):81-101.
Sidney Hook (1944). Is Physical Realism Sufficient? Journal of Philosophy 41 (September):544-550.
Hilary Putnam (1984). Is the Causal Structure of the Physical Itself Something Physical? Midwest Studies in Philosophy 9 (1):3-16.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads59 ( #31,577 of 1,410,127 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #75,890 of 1,410,127 )
How can I increase my downloads?