David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Cambridge University Press (2001)
Scientific Essentialism defends the view that the fundamental laws of nature depend on the essential properties of the things on which they are said to operate, and are therefore not independent of them. These laws are not imposed upon the world by God, the forces of nature, or anything else, but rather are immanent in the world. Ellis argues that ours is a dynamic world consisting of more or less transient objects which are constantly interacting with each other, and whose identities depend on their roles in these processes. Natural objects must behave as they do, because to do otherwise would be contrary to their natures. The laws of nature are, therefore, metaphysically necessary, and consequently, there are necessary connections between events. Brian Ellis calls for the rejection of the theory of Humean Supervenience and an implementation of a new kind of realism in philosophical analysis.
|Keywords||Essentialism (Philosophy Science Philosophy|
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|Call number||B105.E65.E45 2001|
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Jennifer Wang (2015). The Modal Limits of Dispositionalism. Noûs 49 (3):454-469.
Jessica M. Wilson (2005). Supervenience-Based Formulations of Physicalism. Noûs 39 (3):426-459.
Fabrice Correia (2008). Ontological Dependence. Philosophy Compass 3 (5):1013-1032.
Jonathan Schaffer (2005). Quiddistic Knowledge. Philosophical Studies 123 (1-2):1-32.
Tuomas E. Tahko (2015). The Modal Status of Laws: In Defence of a Hybrid View. Philosophical Quarterly 65 (260):509-528.
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