David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophy of Science 30 (1):41-52 (1963)
A theory of true observation is developed as a generalization of the method of inter-observer agreement that scientists use to determine the objectivity and reliability of observations. A true observation is defined as a statement included in a set of statements in which there is statistical dependence and perfect agreement between the statements made by a universe of experimentally independent persons. Meaningfulness--the existence of an objective referent--for each form of statement included in the set is inferred from statistical dependence, correct meaning within the universe of observers from the absence of disagreement. In this theory truth is inferred from a spatio-temporal pattern of statements as behavior rather than from the traditional correspondence between observation and object or logical relationships among statements
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Theodore J. Everett (2010). Observation and Induction. Logos and Episteme 1 (2):303-324.
Willem A. deVries & Paul Coates (2009). Brandom's Two-Ply Error. In Willem A. DeVries (ed.), Empiricism, Perceptual Knowledge, Normativity, and Realism: Essays on Wilfrid Sellars. Oxford University Press
Lars Bergström (1994). Quine's Truth. Inquiry 37 (4):421-435.
Lars Bergström (1994). Quine's Truth. Inquiry 37 (4):421 – 435.
K. S. Shrader-Frechette (1982). Quark Quantum Numbers and the Problem of Microphysical Observation. Synthese 50 (1):125 - 145.
R. G. Swinburne (1974). Meaningfulness Without Confirmability: A Reply. Analysis 35 (1):22 - 27.
David Gooding (1986). How Do Scientists Reach Agreement About Novel Observations? Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 17 (2):205-230.
R. G. Swinburne (1973). Confirmability and Factual Meaningfulness. Analysis 33 (3):71 - 76.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads8 ( #250,895 of 1,700,364 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #269,935 of 1,700,364 )
How can I increase my downloads?