David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Southern Journal of Philosophy 46 (2):199-220 (2008)
It is a mistake to think that instrumental rationality fixes a single standard for judging or describing actions. While there is a core conception of instrumental rationality, we appeal to different elaborations of that conception for different purposes. An action can be instrumentally rational in some sense(s) but not in others. As we learn more about behavior, it is possible to add useful elaborations of the core conception of instrumental rationality. In this paper, I propose a newelaboration based on Frederic Schick’s work on understandings
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Allan Gibbard (1990). Wise Choices, Apt Feelings: A Theory of Normative Judgment. Harvard University Press.
Donald Davidson (1980). Essays on Actions and Events. Oxford University Press.
Cristina Bicchieri (2006). The Grammar of Society: The Nature and Dynamics of Social Norms. Cambridge University Press.
Robert Nozick (1993). The Nature of Rationality. Princeton University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Danny Frederick (2013). Popper, Rationality and the Possibility of Social Science. Theoria 28 (1):61-75.
Ralph Wedgwood (2011). Instrumental Rationality. Oxford Studies in Metaethics 6:280-309.
Thomas Kelly (2007). Evidence and Normativity: Reply to Leite. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (2):465–474.
Bruno Verbeek (2001). Consequentialism, Rationality and the Relevant Description of Outcomes. Economics and Philosophy 17 (2):181-205.
Michael Smith (2004). Instrumental Desires, Instrumental Rationality. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 78 (1):93–109.
Michael Bratman (2009). Intention, Belief, and Instrumental Rationality. In David Sobel & Steven Wall (eds.), Reasons for Action. Cambridge University Press 13--36.
Michael Byron (1998). Satisficing and Optimality. Ethics 109 (1):67-93.
Thomas Kelly (2003). Epistemic Rationality as Instrumental Rationality: A Critique. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3):612–640.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads37 ( #105,080 of 1,789,933 )
Recent downloads (6 months)5 ( #167,785 of 1,789,933 )
How can I increase my downloads?