David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Synthese 189 (S1):39-49 (2012)
Normativism, the approach that judges human rationality by comparison against normative standards, has recently come under intensive criticism as unsuitable for psychological enquiry, and it has been suggested that it should be replaced with a descriptivist paradigm. My goal in this paper is to outline and defend a meta-theoretical framework of such a paradigm, grounded rationality, based on the related principles of descriptivism and (moderate) epistemic relativism. Bounded rationality takes into account universal biological and cognitive limitations on human rationality. Grounded rationality accepts universal constraints but adds cognitive variability: Within-individual variability (dual processing), and individual as well as cultural differences. I discuss the implications of grounded rationality to dual processing, proposing that investing limited cognitive resources in analytic processing might be less instrumentally rational for individuals with low cognitive ability
|Keywords||Descriptivism Grounded rationality Epistemic relativism|
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References found in this work BETA
Mike Oaksford & Nick Chater (2007). Bayesian Rationality: The Probabilistic Approach to Human Reasoning. OUP Oxford.
Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky (eds.) (1982). Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. Cambridge University Press.
Gerd Gigerenzer (1999). Simple Heuristics That Make Us Smart. Oxford University Press.
David Hume (1739/2000). A Treatise of Human Nature. Oxford University Press.
Joseph Henrich, Steven J. Heine & Ara Norenzayan (2010). The Weirdest People in the World. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (2-3):61-83.
Citations of this work BETA
Robert Lockie (2015). Perspectivism, Deontologism and Epistemic Poverty. Social Epistemology 30 (2):133-149.
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