Information theory, evolutionary computation, and Dembski's "complex specified information"

Synthese 178 (2):237 - 270 (2011)
Intelligent design advocate William Dembski has introduced a measure of information called "complex specified information", or CSI. He claims that CSI is a reliable marker of design by intelligent agents. He puts forth a "Law of Conservation of Information" which states that chance and natural laws are incapable of generating CSI. In particular, CSI cannot be generated by evolutionary computation. Dembski asserts that CSI is present in intelligent causes and in the flagellum of Escherichia coli, and concludes that neither have natural explanations. In this paper, we examine Dembski's claims, point out significant errors in his reasoning, and conclude that there is no reason to accept his assertions
Keywords Information theory  Evolutionary computation  Artificial life  Pseudomathematics  Complex specified information
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DOI 10.2307/41477274
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References found in this work BETA
R. M. Sainsbury (1995). Paradoxes. Cambridge University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA
Gregory W. Dawes (2007). What is Wrong with Intelligent Design? International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 61 (2):69 - 81.

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