David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Journal of Moral Philosophy 9 (1):75-102 (2012)
In his book Moral Dimensions. Permissibility, Meaning, Blame , T.M. Scanlon proposes a new account of permissibility, and argues, against the doctrine of double effect (DDE), that intentions do not matter for permissibility. I argue that Scanlon's account of permissibility as based on what the agent should have known at the time of action does not sufficiently take into account Scanlon's own emphasis on permissibility as a question for the deliberating agent. A proper account of permissibility, based on the agent's actual beliefs, will allow us to revise the principle Scanlon proposes for regulating the use of violence in war, and to show that, while the DDE as such might be invalid, its focus on intentions does point toward an important element which Scanlon's proposal lacks, viz. the requirement that the agent believes that her actions will have certain consequences and can be justified for that reason
|Keywords||subjective ought intention Scanlon permissibility doctrine of double effect|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen (2010). Scanlon on the Doctrine of Double Effect. Social Theory and Practice 36 (4):541-564.
Ralph Wedgwood (2011). Scanlon on Double Effect. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (2):464-472.
Lawrence Masek (2010). Intentions, Motives and the Doctrine of Double Effect. Philosophical Quarterly 60 (240):567-585.
T. M. Scanlon (2000). Intention and Permissibility, I. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 74 (1):301–317.
Joshua Stuchlik (2012). A Critique of Scanlon on Double Effect. Journal of Moral Philosophy 9 (2):178-199.
Hallvard Lillehammer (2010). Scanlon on Intention and Permissibility. Analysis 70 (3):578 - 585.
Jonathan Dancy (2000). Intention and Permissibility, II. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 74 (1):319–338.
Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen (2012). Intentions and Discrimination in Hiring. Journal of Moral Philosophy 9 (1):55-74.
Thomas Scanlon (2008). Moral Dimensions: Permissibility, Meaning, Blame. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Matthew Hanser (2005). Permissibility and Practical Inference. Ethics 115 (3):443-470.
Amir Saemi (2009). Intention and Permissibility. Ethical Perspectives 16 (1):81-101.
T. M. Scanlon (2011). Précis of Moral Dimensions: Permissibility, Meaning, Blame. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (2):459-463.
Kevin Vallier (2010). Thomas Scanlon, Moral Dimensions: Permissibility, Meaning, Blame. [REVIEW] Journal of Value Inquiry 44 (4):561-565.
Helga Varden (2011). Coercion and the State. Jurisprudence 2 (2):547-559.
Travis Rieder (2010). T. M. Scanlon, Moral Dimensions: Meaning, Permissibility and Blame. Journal of Moral Philosophy 7 (4):529-533.
Added to index2012-01-25
Total downloads83 ( #50,135 of 1,796,173 )
Recent downloads (6 months)4 ( #208,919 of 1,796,173 )
How can I increase my downloads?