David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophical Explorations 3 (1):25-42 (2000)
I claim that consciousness, just as thought or action, is only to be found at the personal level of explanation. Dennett's account is often taken to be at odds with this view, as it is seen as explicating consciousness in terms of sub-personal processes. Against this reading, and especially as it is developed by John McDowell, I argue that Dennett's work is best understood as maintaining a sharp personal/sub-personal distinction. To see this, however, we need to understand better what content ascription at the sub-personal level actually means. When we do we can see how Dennett presents both a philosophical account of consciousness and informed empirical speculation on the nature of its sub-personal underpinnings. Consciousness is a product of certain capacities that are intelligible only at the personal level, capacities that are neither present at the sub-personal level of brain mechanism nor present in 'sub-persons', e.g. some, if not all, non-human animals.
|Keywords||Consciousness Metaphysics Personal Dennett, D|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
John McDowell (1994). Mind and World. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Daniel C. Dennett (ed.) (1978). Brainstorms: Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology. Bradford Books.
Citations of this work BETA
Susan Hurley (2008). The Shared Circuits Model (SCM): How Control, Mirroring, and Simulation Can Enable Imitation, Deliberation, and Mindreading. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (1):1-22.
Zoe Drayson (2014). The Personal/Subpersonal Distinction. Philosophy Compass 9 (5):338-346.
Ron Chrisley (2014). Appearances Can Be Deceiving: Critical Notice of Consciousness and Robot Sentience. International Journal of Machine Consciousness 6 (1):13-20.
Wim de Muijnck (2011). Valuation by Behaviour. Philosophical Explorations 13 (2):141-155.
Similar books and articles
Jennifer Hornsby (2000). Personal and Sub-Personal: A Defence of Dennett's Early Distinction. Philosophical Explorations 3 (1):6-24.
Shelley Weinberg (2011). Locke on Personal Identity. Philosophy Compass 6 (6):398-407.
Uriah Kriegel (2012). Personal-Level Representation. Protosociology 28:77-114.
José Luis Bermúdez (2000). Personal and Sub-Personal; a Difference Without a Distinction. Philosophical Explorations 3 (1):63 – 82.
Jose Luis Bermudez (2000). Personal and Subpersonal: A Difference Without a Distinction. Philosophical Explorations 3 (1):63-82.
Sara Worley (1997). Belief and Consciousness. Philosophical Psychology 10 (1):41-55.
Sebastian Gardner (2000). Psychoanalysis and the Personal/Sub-Personal Distinction. Philosophical Explorations 3 (1):96-119.
Martin Davies (2000). Persons and Their Underpinnings. Philosophical Explorations 3 (1):43-62.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads89 ( #43,902 of 1,790,126 )
Recent downloads (6 months)7 ( #122,965 of 1,790,126 )
How can I increase my downloads?