David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 110 (3pt3):399-407 (2010)
Incompatibilism is often accused of incoherence because it introduces randomness in support of freedom. I argue that the sort of randomness that's thought to be detrimental to freedom results not from denying causal determinism, so much as denying what we might call ‘rational determinism’: denying that agents' actions are determined by their reasons for acting. Compatibilists argue that introducing the ability to decide differently allows agents to make choices that are irrational, and this undermines rather than furthering freedom. I maintain that this argument neglects scenarios in which reasons are in conflict with one another. In such scenarios, we can preserve rationality without claiming that the agent's choices are rationally determined
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
David Hume (1739/2000). A Treatise of Human Nature. Oxford University Press.
Susan Wolf (1990). Freedom Within Reason. Oxford University Press.
Susan Wolf (1980). Asymmetrical Freedom. Journal of Philosophy 77 (March):151-66.
Jean-Paul Sartre (1948/1977). Existentialism and Humanism. Haskell House.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Paweł Łuków (2007). What is the Problem of Freedom of the Will? Polish Journal of Philosophy 1 (1):65-80.
Paul Hoffman (2008). Freedom and Weakness of Will. Ratio 21 (1):42–54.
Duncan MacIntosh (2001). Prudence and the Reasons of Rational Persons. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (3):346 – 365.
Jules Holroyd (2013). Making Sense of Freedom and Responsibility by Nelkin. [REVIEW] Analysis 73 (1):198-202.
Frank Lucash (1984). What Spinoza's View of Freedom Should Have Been. Philosophy Research Archives 10:491-499.
Ishtiyaque Haji (2009). Freedom and Practical Reason. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (2):169 - 179.
Mark Leon (2000). Believing Autonomously. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 9:169-183.
Mary T. Clark (ed.) (1973). The Problem of Freedom. New York,Appleton-Century-Crofts.
Dana Kay Nelkin (2011). Making Sense of Freedom and Responsibility. Oxford University Press.
Derk Pereboom (2006). Kant on Transcendental Freedom. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (3):537-567.
Conor Mchugh (2014). Exercising Doxastic Freedom. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (1):1-37.
Kien‐How Goh (2015). Between Determinism and Indeterminism: The Freedom of Choice in Fichte's Das System Der Sittenlehre. European Journal of Philosophy 23 (3):439-455.
Nicholas Rescher (2008). Free Will: A Philosophical Reappraisal. Transaction Publishers.
Added to index2010-12-21
Total downloads56 ( #72,365 of 1,789,932 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #317,270 of 1,789,932 )
How can I increase my downloads?