Online research in philosophy

Early on in the Outlines of Pyrrhonism (PH), Sextus Empiricus offers an account of τὸ τέλος τῆς σκεπτικῆς—the aim or final end of Pyrrhonian skepticism. Having previously explained such crucial aspects of Pyrrhonism as the sense in which Skeptics do not hold any beliefs and what its constitutive principles are, in sections I 25-30 Sextus turns to what he seems to regard as the equally important matter of what the aim of Skepticism is. He tells us, An aim [τέλος] is that for the sake of which everything is done or considered, while it is not done or considered for the sake of anything else. Or: an aim is the final object of desire. Up to now we say the aim of the Skeptic is tranquility [ἀταραξία] in matters of opinion and moderation of feeling [μετριοπάθεια] in matters forced on us. (PH I.25)2 In the sense of ‘ethics’ relevant to the Ancients, this constitutes Sextus’ major pronouncement on ethics in the general survey of Skepticism contained in PH I, apart from the specific arguments of the Tenth Mode (PH I 145-163). It is perhaps unsurprising that Sextus’ ethics, the heart of which is evident even in the..

An often overlooked figure today, Aristocles of Messene remains an important source for understanding the philosophical thought of early Pyrrhonism. In this book Dr. Chiesara shows Aristocles to be an accurate historian and trustworthy reporter of the major trends of first century philosophical thought including Platonism, Stoicism, Pyrrhonism, Protagorism, and Epicurism, and to offer precious additions to the history of ancient philosophy, in particular to the reconstruction not only of early but also of late, namely Aenesidemean, Pyrrhonism.

The formulae "perhaps" and "perhaps not," [] we adopt in place of "perhaps it is and perhaps it is not" []. But here again we do not fight about phrases [] these expressions are indicative of non-assertion. Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism One could spend years on [] the perhaps [] whose modality will render fictional and fragile everything that follows []. One does not testify in court and before the law with "perhaps." Jacques Derrida, Demeure: Fiction and Testimony.

In this paper I take a closer look at Sextus Empiricus’ arguments in his Outlines of Pyrrhonism I.25-30 and try to make sense of his account of Skepticism as a goal-directed philosophy. I argue that Sextus fails to mount a convincing case for the view that tranquility, rather than suspension of judgment, is the ultimate goal of his inquiries.

The present paper has two, interrelated objectives. The first is to analyze the different senses in which arguments are characterized as persuasive in the extant writings of Sextus Empiricus. The second is to examine the Pyrrhonist’s therapeutic use of arguments in the discussion with his Dogmatic rivals – more precisely, to determine the sense and basis of Sextus’ distinction between therapeutic arguments that appear weighty and therapeutic arguments that appear weak in their persuasiveness.

The purpose of this paper is twofold: to discuss some challenging issues concerning Sextus’ works and outlook, and to offer an overview of the influence exerted by Sextan Pyrrhonism on both early modern and contemporary philosophy.

A study of Pyrrhonean skepticism, this book includes a new translation of Sextus Empiricus's Outlines of Pyrrhonism, accompanied by an analytic introduction and an in-depth, section-by-section commentary. It presents Pyrrhonism as a marked influence on the philosophical theories of Montaigne, Gassendi, Descartes, Bayle and other major thinkers, and discusses specific features of this form of skepticism which make it immune to many of the standard criticisms.