David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Clarendon Press (2006)
Talking about action comes easily to us. We quickly make distinctions between voluntary and non-voluntary actions; we think we can tell what intentions are; we are confident about evaluating reasons offered in rational justification of action. Berent En provides a philosopher's sustained examination of these issues: he portrays action as belonging to the causal order of events in nature, a theory from which new and surprising accounts of intention and voluntary action emerge. Philosophers and cognitive scientists alike will find How We Act a provocative and enlightening read
|Keywords||Act (Philosophy Causation Reasoning Will Decision making|
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|Call number||B105.A35.E53 2003|
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Citations of this work BETA
Randolph Clarke (2010). Intentional Omissions. Noûs 44 (1):158-177.
Randolph Clarke (2010). Skilled Activity and the Causal Theory of Action. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (3):523-550.
Markus E. Schlosser (2012). Taking Something as a Reason for Action. Philosophical Papers 41 (2):267-304.
Markus E. Schlosser (2007). Basic Deviance Reconsidered. Analysis 67 (295):186–194.
Carolina Sartorio (2009). Omissions and Causalism. Noûs 43 (3):513-530.
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