Causal Theories of Intentional Behavior and Wayward Causal Chains

Behavior and Philosophy 32 (1):149 - 166 (2004)
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Abstract

On a causal theory of rational behavior, behavior is just a causal consequence of the reasons an actor has. One of the difficulties with this theory has been the possibility of the "wayward causal chains," according to which reasons can cause the expected output, but in such an unusual way that the output is clearly not intentional. The inability to find a general way of excluding these wayward chains without implicitly appealing to elements incompatible with a pure causal account (like brute acts of will) has been a problem for the causal theory. This essay attempts to find a general solution to the problem. The solution rests on the premise that behavior-producing systems are goal-directed, and that on a purely causal analysis of goal-directedness it can be shown that the wayward chains' resulting in the goal is purely fortuitous because these chains do not subserve the function of the system.

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Citations of this work

The contours of control.Joshua Shepherd - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (3):395-411.
Out of habit.Santiago Amaya - 2020 - Synthese 198 (12):11161-11185.
An attempt at a general solution to the problem of deviant causal chains.Shane Ward - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.

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References found in this work

Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind.John R. Searle - 1983 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind.John R. Searle - 1983 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1969 - Journal of Philosophy 66 (23):829-839.
On Action.Carl Ginet - 1990 - Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.

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