David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophical Studies 128 (2):441 - 477 (2006)
The hoary philosophical tradition of hedonism – the view that pleasure is the basic ethical or normative value – suggests that it is at least reasonably and roughly intuitive. But philosophers no longer treat hedonism that way. For the most part, they think that they know it to be obviously false on intuitive grounds, much more obviously false on such grounds than familiar competitors. I argue that this consensus is wrong. I defend the intuitive cogency of hedonism relative to the dominant desire-based and objectivist conceptions of well-being and the good. I argue that hedonism is still a contender, and indeed that our current understanding of commonsense intuition on balance supports it.
|Keywords||Philosophy Philosophy Epistemology Logic Philosophy of Mind Philosophy of Religion|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Aristotle (2012). Nicomachean Ethics. Courier Dover Publications.
Jeffrey Goldsworthy (1992). Well-Being and Value. Utilitas 4 (01):1-.
D. W. Haslett (1990). What is Utility? Economics and Philosophy 6 (01):65-.
Immanuel Kant (2007). Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. In Elizabeth Schmidt Radcliffe, Richard McCarty, Fritz Allhoff & Anand Vaidya (eds.), Late Modern Philosophy: Essential Readings with Commentary. Blackwell Pub. Ltd..
Immanuel Kant (1996). The Metaphysics of Morals. Cambridge University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Fred Feldman (2004). Pleasure and the Good Life: Concerning the Nature, Varieties and Plausibility of Hedonism. Clarendon Press.
Peter de Marneffe (2003). An Objection to Attitudinal Hedonism. Philosophical Studies 115 (2):197 - 200.
Peter De Marneffe (2003). An Objection to Attitudinal Hedonism. Philosophical Studies 115 (2):197 - 200.
Justin C. B. Gosling (1969). Pleasure And Desire: The Case For Hedonism Reviewed. Oxford,: Clarendon Press.
Roger Crisp (2006). Hedonism Reconsidered. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (3):619–645.
Tea Logar (2010). “Diagnostic Hedonism” and the Role of Incommensurability in Plato's Protagoras. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 10 (3):241-257.
Chris Heathwood (2006). Desire Satisfactionism and Hedonism. Philosophical Studies 128 (3):539-563.
Dale Dorsey (2011). The Hedonist's Dilemma. Journal of Moral Philosophy 8 (2):173-196.
George Rudebusch (1999). Socrates, Pleasure, and Value. Oxford University Press.
Daniel M. Haybron (2001). Happiness and Pleasure. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (3):501-528.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads64 ( #27,534 of 1,413,407 )
Recent downloads (6 months)8 ( #26,433 of 1,413,407 )
How can I increase my downloads?