Graduate studies at Western
Philosophical Studies 128 (2):441 - 477 (2006)
|Abstract||The hoary philosophical tradition of hedonism – the view that pleasure is the basic ethical or normative value – suggests that it is at least reasonably and roughly intuitive. But philosophers no longer treat hedonism that way. For the most part, they think that they know it to be obviously false on intuitive grounds, much more obviously false on such grounds than familiar competitors. I argue that this consensus is wrong. I defend the intuitive cogency of hedonism relative to the dominant desire-based and objectivist conceptions of well-being and the good. I argue that hedonism is still a contender, and indeed that our current understanding of commonsense intuition on balance supports it.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Fred Feldman (2004). Pleasure and the Good Life: Concerning the Nature, Varieties and Plausibility of Hedonism. Clarendon Press.
Peter de Marneffe (2003). An Objection to Attitudinal Hedonism. Philosophical Studies 115 (2):197 - 200.
Peter De Marneffe (2003). An Objection to Attitudinal Hedonism. Philosophical Studies 115 (2):197 - 200.
Justin C. B. Gosling (1969). Pleasure And Desire: The Case For Hedonism Reviewed. Oxford,: Clarendon Press.
Roger Crisp (2006). Hedonism Reconsidered. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (3):619–645.
Tea Logar (2010). “Diagnostic Hedonism” and the Role of Incommensurability in Plato's Protagoras. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 10 (3):241-257.
Chris Heathwood (2006). Desire Satisfactionism and Hedonism. Philosophical Studies 128 (3):539-563.
Dale Dorsey (2011). The Hedonist's Dilemma. Journal of Moral Philosophy 8 (2):173-196.
George Rudebusch (1999). Socrates, Pleasure, and Value. Oxford University Press.
Daniel M. Haybron (2001). Happiness and Pleasure. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (3):501-528.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads51 ( #24,401 of 727,600 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #61,087 of 727,600 )
How can I increase my downloads?