Putting interpretation in its place

Law and Philosophy 13 (4):451 - 479 (1994)
Abstract
What can a philosophical analysis of the concept of interpretation contribute to legal theory? In his recent book,Interpretation and Legal Theory, Andrei Marmor proposes a complex and ambitious analysis as groundwork for his positivist assault on “interpretive” theories of law and of language. I argue (i) that the crucial element in Marmor's analysis of interpretation is his treatment of Ludwig Wittgenstein's remarks on following rules, and (ii) that a less ambitious analysis of interpretation than Marmor's can take better advantage of those insights about rules. I explore some implications of such an analysis for the role of interpretation in legal reasoning.
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    Claudius Messner (forthcoming). Luhmann's Judgment. International Journal for the Semiotics of Law - Revue Internationale de Sémiotique Juridique:1-29.
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