Believing, holding true, and accepting

Philosophical Explorations 1 (2):140 – 151 (1998)
Belief is not a unified phenomenon. In this paper I argue, as a number of other riters argue, that one should distinguish a variety of belief-like attitudes: believing proper - a dispositional state which can have degrees - holding true - which can occur without understanding what one believes - and accepting - a practical and contextual attitude that has a role in deliberation and in practical reasoning. Acceptance itself is not a unified attitude. I explore the various relationships and differences between these doxastic attitudes, and claim that although acceptance is distinct from belief, it rests upon it, and is therefore a species of belief.
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DOI 10.1080/10001998058538695
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Citations of this work BETA
Richard Dub (2015). Delusions, Acceptances, and Cognitive Feelings. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (3):n/a-n/a.
Raimo Tuomela (2000). Belief Versus Acceptance. Philosophical Explorations 3 (2):122 – 137.
Philip Pettit (1998). Practical Belief and Philosophical Theory. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (1):15 – 33.

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